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Abstract
Training certifiable neural networks enables one to obtain models with robustness guar-
antees against adversarial attacks. In this work, we introduce a framework to bound the
adversary-free region in the neighborhood of the input data by a polyhedral envelope, which
yields finer-grained certified robustness. We further introduce polyhedral envelope regu-
larization (PER) to encourage larger polyhedral envelopes and thus improve the provable
robustness of the models. We demonstrate the flexibility and effectiveness of our framework on
standard benchmarks; it applies to networks of different architectures and general activation
functions. Compared with the state-of-the-art methods, PER has very little computational
overhead and better robustness guarantees without over-regularizing the model.
1 Introduction
Despite their great success in many applications, modern deep learning models are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks: small but well-designed perturbations can make the state-of-the-art models
predict wrong labels with very high confidence [8, 19, 28]. The existence of such adversarial
examples indicates unsatisfactory properties of the deep learning models’ decision boundary [12],
and poses a threat to the reliability of safety-critical machine learning systems.
As a consequence, studying the robustness of deep learning has attracted growing attention,
from the perspective of both attack and defense strategies. Popular attack algorithms, such as
the fast gradient method (FGM) [8], the CW attack [3] and the projected gradient descent (PGD)
algorithm [18], typically exploit the gradient of the loss w.r.t. the input to generate adversarial
examples. To counteract such attacks, many defense algorithms have been proposed [2, 6, 11, 17,
24, 27, 35]. However, it was shown by [1] that most of them depend on obfuscated gradients for
perceived robustness. In other words, these methods train models to fool gradient-based attacks
but do not achieve true robustness. As a consequence, they become ineffective when subjected
to stronger attacks. The only exception is adversarial training [18], which augments the training
data with adversarial examples. Nevertheless, while adversarial training yields good empirical
performance, it still provides no guarantees of a model’s robustness.
In this work, we focus on constructing certifiers to find certified regions of the input neighbor-
hood where the model is guaranteed to give the correct prediction, and on using such certifiers
to train a model to be provably robust against adversarial attacks. In this context, complete
certifiers can either guarantee the absence of an adversary or construct an adversarial example
given an adversarial budget. They are typically built on either Satisfiability Modulo Theories
(SMT) [13] or mixed integer programming (MIP) [29, 34]. The major disadvantages of complete
certifiers are their super-polynomial complexity and applicability to only piecewise linear activa-
tion functions, such as ReLU. By contrast, incomplete certifiers are faster, more widely applicable
but more conservative in terms of certified regions because they rely on approximations. In this
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context, techniques such as linear approximation [15, 33, 37, 32], symbolic interval analysis [31],
abstract transformers [7, 25, 26], semidefinite programming (SDP) [20, 21] and randomized
smoothing [4, 22] have been exploited to offer better certified robustness. Some of these methods
enable training provably robust models [20, 15, 33, 4, 22] by optimizing the model parameters so
as to maximize the area of the certified regions.
While effective, all the above-mentioned certification methods, in their vanilla version, only
provide binary results given a fixed adversarial budget. That is, if a data point is certified,
it is guaranteed to be robust in the entire given adversarial budget; otherwise no guaranteed
adversary-free region is estimated. To overcome this and search for the optimal adversarial budget
that can be certified, [15, 32, 37] use either Newton’s method or binary search. By contrast, [5]
take advantage of the geometric property of ReLU networks and gives finer-grained robustness
guarantees. Given the piecewise linear ReLU function, any input is located in a polytope where
the ReLU network can be considered linear. Based on geometry, robustness guarantees can thus
be calculated using the input data’s distance to the polytope boundary and the decision boundary
constraints. Unfortunately, in practice, the resulting certified bounds are trivial because such
polytopes are very small even for robust models. Nevertheless, [5] introduce a regularization
scheme based on these bounds to effectively train provably robust models.
In this paper, we construct a stronger certifier, as well as a regularization scheme to train
provably robust models. Instead of relying on the linear regions of ReLU networks, we estimate
a linear bound of the model’s output given a predefined adversarial budget. Then, the condition
to guarantee robustness inside this budget is also linear and forms a polyhedral envelope of the
model’s decision boundary. Similarly to [5], the intersection of the polyhedral envelope and the
adversarial budget is guaranteed to be adversary-free. However, in contrast to [5], our method can
be based on any model linearization method and thus applicable to general network architecture
and activation functions. We then further introduce a hinge-loss-like regularization term based
on our certified bound to train provably robust neural network models.
The computational overhead of our method is negligible and thus it has the same complexity as
the model linearization method used. Compared with [5], it is more generally applicable and yields
a more accurate estimation of the decision boundary. Compared with [15, 33], which have been
found to over-regularize the model [36], our method achieves better certified robustness without
sacrificing the clean accuracy too much. In the remainder of the paper, we call our certification
method Polyhedral Envelope Certifier (PEC) and our regularization scheme Polyhedral Envelope
Regularizer (PER).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Terminology
For simplicity, we discuss our approach using a standard N -layer fully-connected network. Note,
however, that it straightforwardly extends to any network topology that can be represented
by a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in the same way as in [16]. A fully-connected network
parameterized by {W(i),b(i)}N−1i=1 can be expressed as
z(i+1) = W(i)zˆ(i) + b(i) i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1
zˆ(i) = σ(z(i)) i = 2, 3, ..., N − 1
(1)
where z(i) and zˆ(i) are the pre- & post-activations of the i-th layer, respectively, and zˆ(1) def== x
is the input of the network. An lp norm-based adversarial budget S(p) (x) is defined as the set
{x′|‖x′ − x‖p ≤ }. x′, z′(i) and zˆ′(i) represent the adversarial input and the corresponding pre-
& post-activations. For layer i having ni neurons, we have W(i) ∈ Rni+1×ni and b(i) ∈ Rni+1 .
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Throughout this paper, underlines and bars are used to represent lower and upper bounds of
adversarial activations, respectively, i.e., z(i) ≤ z′(i) ≤ z¯(i). A “+” or “−” subscript indicates the
positive or negative part of a tensor. We use [K] as the abbreviation for the set {1, 2, ...,K}.
2.2 Model Linearization
Given an adversarial budget S(p) (x), we study the linear bound of the output logits z′(N), given
by
U(N)x′ + p(N) ≤ z′(N) ≤ V(N)x′ + q(N) . (2)
The linear coefficients introduced above can be calculated by iteratively estimating the bounds
of intermediate layers and linearizing the activation functions. In Appendix A.1, we discuss
this for several activation functions, including ReLU, sigmoid, tanh and arctan. Note that our
method differs from [37] because we need the analytical form of the linear coefficients for training,
which removes numerical methods such as binary search. The bounding algorithm trades off
computational complexity and bound tightness. In this work, we study two such algorithms. One
is based on Fast-Lin / CROWN [32, 37]. It yields tighter bounds but has high computational
complexity. Another is inspired by the interval bound propagation (IBP) [10], which instead is
faster but leads to looser bounds. The details of both algorithms are provided in Appendices A.2
and A.3. We briefly discuss the complexity of both algorithms in Section 5.
3 Algorithms
3.1 Robustness Guarantees by Polyhedral Envelope
For an input point x with label c ∈ [K], a sufficient condition to guarantee robustness is that
the lower bounds of z′(N)c − z′(N)i are positive for all i ∈ [K]. Here, we use the elision of the last
layer introduced in [10] to merge the subtraction of z′(N)c and z
′(N)
i with the last linear layer
and obtain the lower bound of z′(N)c − z′(N)i : z′(N)c − z′(N)i def== Uix′ + pi. Then, the sufficient
condition to ensure robustness within a budget S(p) (x) can be written as
z′(N)c − z′(N)i = Uix′ + pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [K] . (3)
The constraint is trivial when i = c, so there are K − 1 such linear constraints, corresponding
to K − 1 hyperplanes in the input space. Within the adversarial budget, these hyperplanes
provide a polyhedral envelope of the true decision boundary. In the remainder of the paper, we
use the term dic to represent the distance between the input and the hyperplane defined in (3)
and define dc = mini∈[K],i 6=c dic as the distance between the input and the polyhedral envelope
boundary. The distance can be based on different lp norms, and dic = 0 when the input itself
does not satisfy the inequality (3). Since (3) is a sufficient condition for robustness given the
adversarial budget S(p) (x), there is no adversarial examples in the intersection of S(p) (x) and
the polytope defined in (3).
The theorem below formalizes our robustness certification. We defer its proof to Appendix C.1.
Theorem 1 (PEC in Unconstrained Cases). Given a model f : Rn1 → [K] and an input point
x with label c, let U and p in (3) be calculated using a predefined adversarial budget S(p) (x).
Then, there is no adversarial example inside an lp norm ball of radius d centered around x, with
d = min {, dc} where dic = max
{
0, Uix+pi‖Ui‖q
}
. lq is the dual norm of the lp norm, i.e., 1p +
1
q = 1.
Based on Theorem 1, when  < dc, PEC has the same robustness guarantees as KW [15],
Fast-Lin [32] and CROWN [37] if we use the same model linearization method. When 0 < dc < ,
3
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Figure 1: Certified l∞-based bound of a randomly picked input by PEC and KW / Fast-Lin for
different values of . The model is the ‘FC1’ on MNIST trained by ‘MMR+at’ in [5]
Figure 2: 2D sketch of decision boundary (dark blue), hyperplane defined by (3) (light blue),
adversarial budget (red), polyhedral envelope (green) in PEC. The distance between the input
data and the hyperplanes is depicted by a yellow circle. The left and right half correspond to the
cases when dc is bigger and smaller than , respectively.
KW / Fast-Lin / CROWN cannot certify the data point at all, while PEC still gives non-
trivial robustness guarantees thanks to the geometric interpretability of the polyhedral envelope.
Figure 1 compares the certified bounds of KW / Fast-Lin and PEC on a randomly picked input
for different values of .
Figure 2 shows a 2D sketch of the two cases mentioned above. If  is too small, as in the
left half of the figure, the linear bounds in (3) are tight but only valid in a small region S(p) (x).
Therefore, the certified robustness is  at most. If  is too large, the linear bounds are valid in a
larger region but more pessimistic. This is because the value of dic monotonically decreases with
the increase of  for all model linearization methods. This is depicted by the right half of the
figure, where the distances between the input and the hyperplanes are smaller and the certified
robustness is then dc. The hyperplane segments inside the adversarial budget (green lines) never
exceed the decision boundary (dark blue lines), by definition of the polyhedral envelope.
To search for the optimal , i.e., the peak in Figure 1, [15] use Newton’s method, which is
an expensive second-order method. By contrast, [32, 37] use binary search, and our PEC can
accelerate their strategy. The acceleration comes from the partial credit when 0 < dc < , in
which case we can rule out all values of  below dc and obtain a better lower bound of the optimal
. A more detailed discussion is provided in Appendix B.1.
In many applications, the input is constrained in a hypercube [r(min), r(max)]n1 . For example,
for images with normalized pixel values, an attacker will not perturb the image out of the
hypercube [0, 1]n1 . Because of this constraint for the attacker, the certified regions become larger.
To obtain robustness guarantees in this scenario, we need to recalculate dic, which is now the
distance between the input and the hyperplanes in (3) within the hypercube. The value of dic
then is the minimum of the optimization problem
min
∆
‖∆‖p
s.t. a∆ + b ≤ 0, ∆(min) ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆(max)
(4)
where, to simplify the notation, we define a = Ui, b = Uix + p, ∆(min) = r(min) − x and
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∆(max) = r(max) − x. When b ≤ 0, the minimum is obviously 0 as the optimal ∆ is an all-zero
vector. In this case, either we cannot certify the input at all, or even the clean input is misclassified.
When b > 0, by Hölder’s inequality, a∆ + b ≥ −‖∆‖p‖a‖q + b, with equality reached when ∆p
and aq are collinear. Based on this, the optimal ∆ of minimum lp norm to satisfy a∆ + b ≤ 0 is
∆̂i = − b‖a‖qq sign(ai) |ai|
q
p , (5)
where sign(·) returns +1 for positive numbers and −1 for negative numbers.
To satisfy the constraint ∆(min) ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆(max), we use a greedy algorithm that approaches
this goal progressively. That is, we first calculate the optimal ∆̂ based on Equation (5) and check
if the constraint ∆(min) ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆(max) is satisfied. For the elements where it is not, we clip their
values within [∆(min),∆(max)] and keep them fixed. We then optimize the remaining elements of
∆ in the next iteration and repeat this process until the constraint is satisfied for all elements.
The pseudo-code is provided as Algorithm 1 below and its optimality is guaranteed.
Corollary 1. If the maximum number of iterations I(max) in Algorithm 1 is large enough to
make ∆(min) ≤ ∆̂ ≤ ∆(max) satisfied in Problem (4), then the output ‖∆̂‖p is the optimum of
Problem (4), i.e., dic.
We can use the primal-dual method to prove Corollary 1, which we defer to Appendix C.2.
Once we have the value of dic and thus dc, the certified bound in this constrained case is then
min{, dc}, as demonstrated by Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1: Greedy algorithm to solve Problem (4).
Input: x, a, b, ∆(min), ∆(max) in (4) and maximum number of iterations allowed I(max)
Set of fixed elements S(f) = ∅
Iteration number i = 0
Calculate ∆̂ according to (5)
while ∆(min) ≤ ∆̂ ≤ ∆(max) not satisfied and i < I(max) do
Violated entries S(v) = {i|∆̂i < ∆(min)i or ∆̂i > ∆(max)i }
∆̂i = clip(∆̂i,min = ∆
(min)
i ,max = ∆
(max)
i ), i ∈ S(v)
S(f) = S(f) ∪ S(v)
Update ∆̂ according to (5) with elements in S(f) fixed
Update i = i+ 1
end while
Output: ‖∆̂‖p
We observed I(max) = 20to be sufficient to satisfy the condition of Corollary 1. In practice,
the while-loop breaks within 5 iterations in most cases, which means Algorithm 1 introduces
little overhead. If I(max) is set so small that the while-loop breaks with ∆(min) ≤ ∆̂ ≤ ∆(max)
unsatisfied, then the output of Algorithm 1 is the upper bound of Problem (4), and thus we
eventually get a suboptimal but still valid robustness guarantee.
3.2 Geometry-Inspired Regularization
As in [5], we can incorporate our certification bounds in the training process so as to obtain more
robust models. To this end, we design a regularization term that encourages larger values of dc.
We first introduce the signed distance d˜ic: when dic > 0, the clean input satisfies (3) and d˜ic = dic;
when dic = 0, the clean input does not satisfy (3) and there is no certified region; d˜ic in this case is a
negative number whose absolute value is the distance between the input and the hyperplane defined
in (3). If the input is unconstrained, we have d˜ic = Uix+pi‖Ui‖q . Otherwise, following the notation of
(4), d˜ic = sign(b)‖∆̂‖p, where ∆̂ = arg min∆ ‖∆‖p, s.t. a∆ + b = 0,∆(min) ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆(max). This
problem can be solved by a greedy algorithm similar to the one in Section 3.1.
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Now, we sort {d˜ic}K−1i=0,i 6=c as d˜j0c ≤ d˜j1c ≤ ... ≤ d˜jK−3c ≤ d˜jK−2c and then define the Polyhedral
Envelope Regularization (PER) term, based on the smallest T distances, as
PER(x, α, γ, T ) = γ
T−1∑
i=0
max
(
0, 1− d˜jic
α
)
. (6)
Note that, following [5], to accelerate training, we take into account the smallest T distances.
When d˜jic ≥ α, the distance is considered large enough, so the corresponding term will not
contribute to the gradient of the model parameters. This avoids over-regularization and allows
us to maintain accuracy on clean inputs. In practice, we do not activate PER in the early
training stages, when the model is not well trained and the corresponding polyhedral envelope is
meaningless. Such a ‘warm up’ trick is commonly used in deep learning practice [9].
We can further incorporate PER with adversarial training in a similar way to [5]. Here, the
distance d˜jic in (6) is calculated between the polyhedral envelope and the adversarial example
generated by PGD [18] instead of the clean input. Note that, the polyhedral envelope is the
same in both cases because it depends on the adversarial budget. We call this method PER+at.
Calculating the polyhedral envelope is expensive in terms of both computation and memory
because of the need to obtain linear bounds of the output logits. We conduct a comprehensive
complexity analysis in Section 5. To prevent a prohibitive computational and memory overhead,
we use the stochastic robust approximation of [30]. For a mini-batch of size B, we only calculate
the PER or PER+at regularization term for B′ < B instances sub-sampled from this mini-batch.
[19] empirically observed the geometric correlation of high-dimensional decision boundaries near
the data manifold. Thus, in practice, a B′ much smaller than B provides a good approximation
of the full-batch regularization.
4 Experiments
To validate the theory and algorithms above, we conducted several experiments on two popular
image classification benchmarks: MNIST and CIFAR10. Each of these experiments can be
completed on a single GPU machine within hours. We will make the code and checkpoints
publicly available.
4.1 Training and Certifying ReLU Networks
As the main experiment, we first demonstrate the benefits of our approach over the state-of-
the-art training and certification methods. To this end, we use the same model architectures as
in [5, 15]: FC1, which is a fully-connected network with one hidden layer of 1024 neurons; and
CNN, which has two convolutional layers followed by two fully-connected layers. For this set of
experiments, all activation functions are ReLU.
When it comes to training, we consider 7 baselines, including plain training (plain), adversarial
training (at) [18], KW [15], IBP [10], CROWN-IBP [36], MMR, MMR plus adversarial training
(MMR + at) [5]. We denote our method as C-PER, C-PER+at when we use CROWN-style
model linearization for PER and PER+at, respectively, and as I-PER and I-PER+at when using
IBP-style model linearization. To evaluate robustness, we report the results of Fast-Lin [32],
IBP [10] and our proposed PEC, in addition to the clean test error (CTE) and the empirical
robust error against PGD (PGD). Note that KW [15] is algorithmically equivalent to Fast-Lin
with elision of the last layer [23], so we consider them as one certification method, denoted as
Lin. Based on the discussions in Section 3.1, KW, Fast-Lin and PEC have the same certified
robust error, which is the proportion of the inputs whose certified regions are smaller than the
adversarial budget. Therefore, for these three methods, we report the certified robust error as
CRE Lin, and also report the IBP one (CRE IBP). In addition, we calculate the average certified
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CTE
(%)
PGD
(%)
CRE
Lin
(%)
CRE
IBP
(%)
ACB
Lin
ACB
IBP
ACB
PEC
CTE
(%)
PGD
(%)
CRE
Lin
(%)
CRE
IBP
(%)
ACB
Lin
ACB
IBP
ACB
PEC
MNIST - FC1, ReLU, l∞,  = 0.1 MNIST - FC1, ReLU, l2,  = 0.3
plain 1.99 98.37 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.99 9.81 40.97 99.30 0.1771 0.0021 0.2300
at 1.42 9.00 97.94 100.00 0.0021 0.0000 0.0099 1.35 2.99 14.85 99.23 0.2555 0.0023 0.2684
KW 2.26 8.59 12.91 69.20 0.0871 0.0308 0.0928 1.23 2.70 4.91 41.55 0.2853 0.1754 0.2892
IBP 1.65 9.67 87.27 15.20 0.0127 0.0848 0.0705 1.36 2.90 6.87 9.01 0.2794 0.2730 0.2876
C-IBP 1.98 9.50 67.39 14.45 0.0326 0.0855 0.0800 1.26 2.80 6.36 8.73 0.2809 0.2738 0.2884
MMR 2.11 17.82 33.75 99.88 0.0663 0.0001 0.0832 2.40 5.88 7.76 99.55 0.2767 0.0013 0.2845
MMR+at 2.04 10.39 17.64 95.09 0.0824 0.0049 0.0905 1.77 3.76 5.68 99.86 0.2830 0.0004 0.2880
C-PER 1.60 7.45 11.71 92.89 0.0883 0.0071 0.0935 1.26 2.44 5.35 59.17 0.2840 0.1225 0.2888
C-PER+at 1.81 7.73 12.90 99.90 0.0871 0.0001 0.0925 0.67 1.40 4.84 64.79 0.2855 0.1056 0.2910
I-PER 1.60 6.28 11.96 93.33 0.0880 0.0067 0.0934 1.21 2.59 5.34 54.13 0.2840 0.1376 0.2888
I-PER+at 1.54 7.15 13.96 98.55 0.0868 0.0014 0.0927 0.74 1.46 7.81 72.85 0.2766 0.0814 0.2860
MNIST - CNN, ReLU, l∞,  = 0.1 MNIST - CNN, ReLU, l2,  = 0.3
plain 1.28 85.75 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.28 4.93 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
at 1.02 4.75 91.91 100.00 0.0081 0.0000 0.0189 1.12 2.50 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
KW 1.21 3.03 4.44 100.00 0.0956 0.0000 0.0971 1.11 2.05 5.84 100.00 0.2825 0.0000 0.2861
IBP 1.51 4.43 23.89 8.13 0.0761 0.0919 0.0872 2.37 3.85 51.12 11.73 0.1534 0.2648 0.1669
C-IBP 1.85 4.28 10.72 6.91 0.0893 0.0931 0.0928 2.89 4.44 31.62 12.29 0.2051 0.2631 0.2178
MMR 1.65 6.09 11.56 100.00 0.0884 0.0000 0.0928 2.57 5.49 10.03 100.00 0.2699 0.0000 0.2788
MMR+at 1.19 3.35 9.49 100.00 0.0905 0.0000 0.0939 1.73 3.22 9.46 100.00 0.2716 0.0000 0.2780
C-PER 1.44 3.44 5.13 100.00 0.0949 0.0000 0.0965 1.02 1.87 5.04 100.00 0.2849 0.0000 0.2882
C-PER+at 0.50 2.02 4.85 100.00 0.0952 0.0000 0.0969 0.43 0.91 5.43 100.00 0.2837 0.0000 0.2878
I-PER 1.03 2.40 4.64 99.55 0.0954 0.0004 0.0967 1.11 2.16 6.37 100.00 0.2809 0.0000 0.2851
I-PER+at 0.48 1.29 4.61 99.94 0.0954 0.0001 0.0971 0.52 1.12 7.89 100.00 0.2763 0.0000 0.2812
CIFAR10 - CNN, ReLU, l∞,  = 2/255 CIFAR10 - CNN, ReLU, l2,  = 0.1
plain 24.62 86.29 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 23.29 47.39 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
at 27.04 48.53 85.36 100.00 0.0011 0.0000 0.0015 25.84 35.81 99.96 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
KW 39.27 48.16 53.81 99.98 0.0036 0.0000 0.0040 40.24 43.87 48.98 100.00 0.0510 0.0000 0.0533
IBP 46.74 56.38 61.81 67.58 0.0030 0.0025 0.0034 57.90 60.03 64.78 78.13 0.0352 0.0219 0.0366
C-IBP 58.32 63.56 66.28 69.10 0.0026 0.0024 0.0029 71.21 72.51 76.23 80.97 0.0238 0.0190 0.0256
MMR 34.59 57.17 69.28 100.00 0.0024 0.0000 0.0032 40.93 50.57 57.07 100.00 0.0429 0.0000 0.0480
MMR+at 35.36 49.27 59.91 100.00 0.0031 0.0000 0.0037 37.78 43.98 53.33 100.00 0.0467 0.0000 0.0502
C-PER 39.21 50.98 57.45 99.98 0.0033 0.0000 0.0038 34.10 52.54 63.42 100.00 0.0369 0.0000 0.0465
C-PER+at 28.87 43.55 56.59 100.00 0.0034 0.0000 0.0040 25.76 33.47 46.74 100.00 0.0533 0.0000 0.0580
I-PER 29.34 51.54 64.34 99.98 0.0028 0.0000 0.0036 33.94 43.06 56.80 100.00 0.0432 0.0000 0.0484
I-PER+at 26.66 43.35 57.72 100.00 0.0033 0.0000 0.0040 24.85 31.32 47.28 100.00 0.0528 0.0000 0.0572
Table 1: Full results of 11 training schemes and 7 evaluation schemes for ReLU networks. The
best and second best results among provably robust training methods (plain and at excluded)
are marked in grey and light grey, respectively.
bound obtained by Fast-Lin / KW (ACB Lin), IBP (ACB IBP) and PEC (ACB PEC). Note that
the average certified bound here is from one-shot Fast-Lin / KW / IBP / PEC , i.e., without
searching for the optimal adversarial budget. We do not report the certified bound obtained by
MMR [5], because, in practice, it only gives trivial results. As a matter of fact, [5] emphasize
their training method and report certification results using only KW and MIP [29].
We use the same adversarial budgets as [5] and thus directly download the KW, MMR
and MMR+at models from the checkpoints provided by them.1 For CNN models, we use the
warm up trick consisting of performing adversarial training before adding our PER or PER+at
regularization term. The running time overhead of pre-training is negligible compared with
computing the regularization term. We train all models for 100 epochs and provide the detailed
hyper-parameter settings in Appendix D.1.
We constrain the attacker to perturb the images within [0, 1]n1 , and the full results for both
the l∞ and l2 cases are summarized in Table 1. Among the training methods, our (C/I)-PER or
(C/I)-PER+at achieve the best certified accuracy in most cases, followed by KW, and significantly
outperform other baselines. The performance of I-PER and I-PER+at is comparable with the one
of C-PER and C-PER+at, which illustrates that our framework is not sensitive to the tightness
of the underlying model linearization method and thus generally applicable. We observe that
IBP is only able to certify IBP-trained models and has worse certification results than methods
based on model linearization. Consistently with Section 3.1, our geometry-inspired PEC has
better average certified bounds than Fast-Lin / KW given the same adversarial budget. For
example, on the CIFAR10 model against l∞ attack, 10%− 20% of the test points are not certified
by Fast-Lin / KW but have non-trivial bounds with PEC. Figure 10 of Appendix D.2.2 shows
the distribution of the certified bounds on the test data.
When compared with KW, our methods, especially PER+at, have much better clean test
1Repository: https://github.com/max-andr/provable-robustness-max-linear-regions.
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Figure 3: Parameter value distributions of CIFAR10 models trained against l∞ attacks. The
Euclidean norms of KW, MMR+at, PER+at models against l∞ attack are 18.08, 38.36 and 94.63
respectively, which evidences that the KW model is over-regularized while our PER model best
preserves the model capacity.
accuracy. In other words, a model trained by (C-I)-PER+at is not as over-regularized as other
training methods for provable robustness. Figure 3 shows the distribution of parameter values
of KW, MMR+at, C-PER+at models on CIFAR10 against l∞ attack. The results of CIFAR10
models against l2 attack are shown in Figure 8 of Appendix D.2.1. The parameters of C-PER+at
models have the largest norms and thus better preserve the model capacity.
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Figure 4: CTE and CRE for different values of γ in C-PER+at to show their trade-off. The results
of KW, for reference, are the horizontal dashed lines. The optimal value of γ for C-PER+at is
1.0, with both CTE and CRE better than KW.
The better performance of (C/I)-PER+at over (C/I)-PER, and of MMR+at over MMR,
evidences the benefits of augmenting the training data with adversarial examples. However, this
trick is only compatible with methods that rely on estimating the distance between the data
point and the decision boundary, and thus cannot be combined with methods like KW. If we
simply add a loss term on adversarial examples to KW, we will reach a performance between
KW and adversarial training (at), which is weaker than KW in terms of provable robustness.
To demonstrate the trade-off between clean test error and certified robust error, we evaluate
our approach with different regularizer strength γ in (6). Figure 4 shows the results of C-
PER+at in the l2 case for CIFAR10. When γ is small, C-PER+at becomes similar to adversarial
training (at) and has low clean test error but high certified robust error. As γ grows, the
model is increasingly regularized towards large polyhedral envelopes, which inevitably hurts the
performance on the clean input. By contrast, the certified robust error first decreases and then
increases. This is because training is numerically more difficult when γ is too large and the model
is over-regularized. The results of KW are shown as horizontal dashed lines for comparison,
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ACB
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CTE
(%)
PGD
(%)
CRE
CRO
(%)
CRE
IBP
(%)
ACB
CRO
ACB
IBP
ACB
PEC
MNIST - FC1, Sigmoid, l∞,  = 0.1 MNIST - FC1, Sigmoid, l2,  = 0.3
plain 2.04 97.80 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.01 10.25 30.78 94.82 0.2077 0.0155 0.2539
at 1.78 10.05 98.52 100.00 0.0015 0.0000 0.0055 1.65 3.48 7.50 85.84 0.2775 0.0422 0.2839
IBP 2.06 10.58 44.14 13.65 0.0559 0.0863 0.0846 1.40 3.07 6.43 9.13 0.2807 0.2726 0.2873
C-IBP 2.88 9.83 26.04 12.51 0.0740 0.0875 0.0886 1.51 3.24 6.36 8.73 0.2709 0.2738 0.2872
C-PER 1.97 7.55 12.15 84.76 0.0879 0.0152 0.0930 1.36 2.58 6.12 73.71 0.2816 0.0789 0.2867
C-PER+at 2.16 7.12 11.87 88.06 0.0881 0.0119 0.0927 0.46 1.03 5.26 68.94 0.2842 0.0932 0.2905
I-PER 2.15 8.35 12.79 86.99 0.0872 0.0130 0.0926 1.19 2.59 6.05 70.18 0.2818 0.0895 0.2871
I-PER+at 2.45 8.05 12.36 88.94 0.0876 0.0111 0.0923 0.49 1.16 5.03 65.79 0.2849 0.1026 0.2907
MNIST - FC1, Tanh, l∞,  = 0.1 MNIST - FC1, Tanh, l2,  = 0.3
plain 2.00 97.80 100.00 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.94 16.46 61.66 99.64 0.1150 0.0011 0.1789
at 1.28 8.89 99.98 100.00 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 1.36 3.02 12.35 97.66 0.2630 0.0070 0.2735
IBP 2.04 9.84 31.81 13.02 0.0682 0.0870 0.0864 1.57 3.17 7.21 10.44 0.2784 0.2688 0.2851
C-IBP 2.75 9.57 20.10 11.80 0.0799 0.0882 0.0894 1.50 3.14 6.64 9.53 0.2801 0.2714 0.2861
C-PER 2.19 7.71 11.55 57.81 0.0885 0.0422 0.0934 1.31 2.47 5.53 55.17 0.2834 0.1345 0.2880
C-PER+at 2.30 7.45 11.39 56.74 0.0886 0.0433 0.0930 0.58 1.30 5.89 54.88 0.2823 0.1354 0.2885
I-PER 2.21 8.51 12.23 55.53 0.0878 0.0445 0.0929 1.38 2.85 5.90 45.31 0.2823 0.1641 0.2874
I-PER+at 2.46 7.87 12.04 66.04 0.0880 0.0340 0.0929 0.55 1.17 5.57 53.73 0.2833 0.1388 0.2890
Table 2: Full results of 8 training schemes and 7 evaluation schemes for sigmoid and tanh
networks. The best results among provably robust training methods (plain and at excluded) are
marked in grey.
which evidences that C-PER+at is less over-regularized in general than KW, with much lower
clean test error for the same certified robust error.
4.2 Training and Certifying Non-ReLU Networks
To validate our method’s applicability to non-ReLU networks, we replace the ReLU function in
FC1 models with either sigmoid or tanh function. MMR and MMR+at are no longer applicable
here, because they only support piece-wise linear activation functions. While [33] claim that their
methods apply to non-ReLU networks, their main contribution is rather the extension of KW
to a broader set of network architectures, and their public code2 does not support non-ReLU
activations. For evaluation, we replace Fast-Lin and KW with CROWN [37] and thus report its
certified robust error (CRE CRO) and average certified bound (ACB CRO). We use the model
linearization method in Appendix A.1 for C-PER and C-PER+at, because we need an analytical
form of the linearization in order to calculate the model parameters’ gradients. When we certify
models using CROWN, the model linearization method of [37] is used because it is tighter.
Table 2 leads to similar conclusions to the ReLU networks in Section 4.1. Our (C/I)-PER
and (C/I)-PER+at methods have the best performance in all cases, in terms of both certified
robust error and average certified bound. IBP can only certify IBP-trained models well and has
significantly worse results on other models.
4.3 The Optimal Adversarial Budget
To obtain the biggest certified bound, we need to search for the optimal value of , i.e., the peak
in Figure 1. While KW [15] uses Newton’s method to solve a constrained optimization problem,
which is expensive, Fast-Lin and CROWN [32, 37] apply a binary search strategy to find the
optimal . The optimal adversarial budget for a data point is also its optimal certified bound.
To validate the claim in Section 3.1 that PEC can find the optimal adversarial budget faster
than Fast-Lin / CROWN, we compare the average number of iterations needed to find the
optimal value given a required precision ∆. Using  and ¯ to define the initial lower and upper
estimates of the optimal value, then we need dlog2 ¯−∆ e steps of bound calculation to obtain the
optimal value by binary search in Fast-Lin / CROWN. By contrast, the number of iterations
needed by PEC depends on the model to certify. The number of iterations by PEC is guaranteed
to be smaller than for Fast-Lin / CROWN, because the partial certified bounds obtained by
2Repository: https://github.com/locuslab/convex_adversarial
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Figure 5: Distribution of optimal certified bounds of CIFAR10 models trained against l∞ attacks.
The target bound (2/255) is indicated by a red vertical line.
PEC indicate tighter lower bounds of the optimal adversarial budget. The pseudo-code of the
search algorithm is provided in Appendix B.1.
We briefly discuss the experimental results here, and defer their details to Appendix D.2.3.
Note that, because PEC has almost no computational overhead compared with Fast-Lin and
CROWN, the number of iterations reflects the running time to obtain the optimal certified
bounds. Altogether, our results show that PEC can save on average 25% of the running time
for FC1 models with ReLU, 15% for FC1 models with non-ReLU activations and 10% for CNN
models.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of optimal certified bounds for CIFAR10 models against l∞
attacks obtained by KW, MMR+at and C-PER+at on the test set. The results on l2 attacks are
shown in Figure 9 of Appendix D.2.1. We use vertical red lines to represent the target bounds, so
the area on the right of this line is the certified robust accuracy. Compared with KW, the mass of
C-PER+at is more concentrated on a narrower range on the right of the red line. This evidences
that there are significantly fewer points that have unnecessarily large certified bounds for the
C-PER+at model than for the KW one. This is because PER+at encourages robustness via a
hinge-loss term. When d˜ic ≥ α, the regularizer in Equation (6) is a constant zero and does not
contribute to the parameter gradient. However, KW first estimates the bound of the worst case
output logits and calculates the softmax cross-entropy loss on that. Under this training objective
function, each data point is encouraged to make the lower bound of the true label’s output logit
bigger and the upper bound of false ones smaller, even if the current model is sufficiently robust
at this point. This phenomenon also helps to explain why KW tends to over-regulate the model
while our methods do not.
5 Discussion
Let us consider an N -layer neural network model with k-dimensional output and m-dimensional
input. For simplicity, let each hidden layer have n neurons and usually n max{k,m} is satisfied.
In this context, the linearization algorithm based on Fast-Lin / CROWN needs O(N2n3) FLOPs
to obtain linear bounds of the output logits. However, the complexity can be reduced to
O(Nn2m) at the cost of bound tightness when we use the IBP-inspired algorithm. In MMR [5],
the complexity to calculate the expression of the input’s linear region is also O(Nn2m). On the
training side, KW needs a back-propagation to calculate the bound, which costs O(Nn2). MMR
needs to calculate the distance between the input and O(Nn) hyper-planes, costing O(Nnm)
FLOPs, while PER only calculates O(k) hyperplanes, thus requiring O(km) FLOPs. Overall, we
can see that the estimation of the output logits or decision boundary dominates the complexity
of all training algorithms and is the main barrier towards scalable provably robust training.
We can conclude that the complexity of C-PER is O(N2n3), similar to that of Fast-Lin /
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CROWN. The overhead to calculate the distances dic can be ignored here. With IBP-inspired
model linearization, the complexity can be reduced to O(Nn2m) in I-PER. Note that the FLOP
complexity of PGD with h iterations is O(Nn2h) and typically h min{m,n}, so the overhead
of (C/I)-PER+at over (C/I)-PER and the adversarial training warm up phase is also negligible.
No matter which linearization method we use, the bounds of the output logits inevitably
become looser for deeper networks, which can be a problem for large models. Furthermore, the
linear approximation implicitly favors the l∞ norm over other lp norms because the intermediate
bounds are calculated in an elementwise manner [16]. As a result, our method performs better
in l∞ cases than in l2 cases. Designing a training algorithm with scalable and tight certified
robustness is highly non-trivial and worth further exploration.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the robustness of neural networks from a geometric perspective.
In our framework, linear bounds are estimated for the model’s output under an adversarial
budget. Then, the polyhedral envelope resulting from the linear bounds allows us to obtain
quantitative robustness guarantees. Our certification method can give non-trivial robustness
guarantees to more data points than existing methods. Furthermore, we have shown that our
certified bounds can be turned into a geometry-inspired regularization scheme that enables
training provably robust models. Compared with existing methods, our framework can be applied
to neural networks with general activation functions. Unlike many over-regularized methods, it
can achieve provable robustness at very little loss in clean accuracy. Extending this framework
to larger networks will be the focus of our future research.
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A Model Linearization
A.1 Linearization of Activation Functions
In this section, we discuss the choice of d, l and h in the linear approximation dx+l ≤ σ(x) ≤ dx+h
for activation function σ when x ∈ [x, x¯]. The method used here is slightly different from that
of [37]. First, the slope of the linear upper and lower bound is the same for simplicity. Second,
all coefficients need to have an analytical form because we need to calculate the gradient based
on them during training. Note that [37] use binary search to obtain the optimal d, l, h.
A.1.1 ReLU
As Figure 6 shows, the linear approximation for ReLU σ(x) = max(0, x), which is convex, is:
d =

0 x ≤ x¯ ≤ 0
x¯
x¯− x x < 0 < x¯
1 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯
, l = 0, h =

0 x ≤ x¯ ≤ 0
− xx¯
x¯− x x < 0 < x¯
0 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯
(7)
−6 −3 0 3 6−3
0
3
6
(a) x ≤ x¯ ≤ 0
−6 −3 0 3 6−3
0
3
6
(b) x < 0 < x¯
−6 −3 0 3 6−3
0
3
6
(c) 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯
Figure 6: Linearization of the ReLU function in all scenarios.
A.1.2 Sigmoid, Tanh
Unlike the ReLU function, the sigmoid function σ(x) = 1
1+e−x and tanh function σ(x) =
e2x−1
e2x+1
are not convex. However, these two functions are convex when x < 0 and concave when x > 0
(left and right sub-figures of Figure 7). Therefore, when x ≤ x¯ ≤ 0 or 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯, we can easily
obtain a tight linear approximation. When x ≤ 0 ≤ x¯, we do not use the binary research to
obtain a tight linear approximation as in [37], because the results would not have an analytical
form in this way. Instead, we first calculate the slope between the two ends, i.e., d = σ(x¯)−σ(x)x¯−x .
Then, we bound the function by two tangent lines of the same slope as d (middle sub-figure of
Figure 7).
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Figure 7: Linearization of the sigmoid function in all scenarios.
For sigmoid and tanh, we can calculate the coefficients of the linear approximation as
d =
σ(x¯)− σ(x)
x¯− x , l =

σ(t1)− t1d x < 0
x¯σ(x)− xσ(x¯)
x¯− x 0 ≤ x ≤ x¯
, h =

x¯σ(x)− xσ(x¯)
x¯− x x ≤ x¯ ≤ 0
σ(t2)− t2d 0 < x¯
(8)
The coefficients t1 < 0 < t2 are the position of tangent points on both sides of the origin.
The definitions of t1 and t2 for different activation functions are provided in Table 3.
σ Sigmoid Tanh
t1 − log −(2d−1)+
√
1−4d
2d
1
2 log
−(d−2)−2√1−d
d
t2 − log −(2d−1)−
√
1−4d
2d
1
2 log
−(d−2)+2√1−d
d
Table 3: Definition of t1 and t2 for different activation functions.
A.2 Bounds based on Fast-Lin / CROWN
Based on the linear approximation of activation functions above, we have D(i)z′(i) + l(i) ≤
σ(z′(i)) ≤ D(i)z′(i) +u(i) where D(i) is a diagonal matrix and l(i), u(i) are vectors. We can rewrite
this formulation as follows:
∃D(i), l(i),u(i) : ∀z′(i) ∈ [z(i), z¯(i)], ∃m(i) ∈ [l(i),u(i)] s.t.σ(z′(i)) = D(i)z′(i) +m(i) . (9)
We plug (9) into (1), and the expression of z′(i) can be rewritten as
z′(i) = W(i−1)(σ(W(i−2)(...σ(W(1)zˆ′(1) + b(1))...) + b(i−2))) + b(i−1)
= W(i−1)(D(i−1)(W(i−2)(...D(2)(W(1)x′ + b(1)) +m(2)...) + b(i−2)) +m(i−1)) + b(i−1)
=
(
i−1∏
k=1
W(k)D(k)
)
W(1)x′ +
i−1∑
j=1
 i−1∏
k=j+1
W(k)D(k)
b(j) + i−1∑
j=2
 i−1∏
k=j+1
W(k)D(k)
W(j)m(j) . (10)
This is a linear function w.r.t. x′ and {m(j)}i−1j=2. Once given the perturbation budget S(p) (x)
and the bounds of {m(j)}i−1j=2, we can calculate the bounds of z′(i) and the bias term in (10).
This process can be repeated until we obtain the bound of the output logits (2). The derivation
here is the same as in [32, 16], we encourage interested reader to check these works for details.
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A.3 Bounds Inspired by Interval Bound Propagation
Interval Bound Propagation (IBP), introduced in [10], is a simple and scalable method to estimate
the bounds of each layer in neural networks. IBP is much faster than the algorithm introduced
in Appendix A.2 because the bounds of any intermediate layer are calculated only based on
the information of its immediate previous layer. Therefore, the bounds are propagated just like
inference in network models, which costs only O(N) matrix-vector multiplications for an N -layer
network defined in (1).
In our work, we need linear bounds of the output logits in addition to general numeric bounds,
so the linearization of activation functions defined in (9) is necessary. We define linear bounds
U(i)x′ + p(i) ≤ z′(i) ≤ U(i)x′ + q(i), Û(i)x′ + pˆ(i) ≤ zˆ′(i) ≤ Û(i)x′ + qˆ(i). We use the same slope
as in Section A.1 to linearize the activation functions, so the slopes of both bounds are the same.
Plugging (9) into this formulation, we have
Û(i) = D(i)U(i), pˆ(i) = D(i)p(i) + l(i), qˆ(i) = D(i)q(i) + u(i) . (11)
Here, we assume that the activation functions are monotonically increasing, so the elements
in D(i) are non-negative. Similarly, by comparing the linear bounds of zˆ′(i) and z′(i+1), we have
U(i+1) = W(i)Û(i), p(i+1) = W
(i)
+ pˆ
(i) +W
(i)
− qˆ
(i) + b(i), q(i+1) = W
(i)
+ qˆ
(i) +W
(i)
− pˆ
(i) + b(i) .
(12)
By definition, we have Û(1) = I and pˆ(1) = qˆ(1) = 0. Applying (11) and (12) iteratively
allows us to obtain the values of the coefficients U(N), V(N), p(N) and q(N) in (2).
B Algorithms
B.1 Algorithms for Searching the Optimal 
The pseudo code for finding the optimal  is provided as Algorithm 2 below. M, x, ∆, , ¯
represent the classification model, the input point, the precision requirement, the predefined
estimate of the lower bound and of the upper bound, respectively. Typically,  is set to 0 and ¯
is set to a large value corresponding to a perceptible the image perturbation. f is a function
mapping a model, an input point and a value of  to a certified bound. f is a generalized form of
the Fast-Lin, CROWN, PEC,... algorithms.
During the search for the optimal , the lower bound is updated by the current certified
bound, while the upper bound is updated only when the current certified bound is smaller than
the choice of . In Fast-Lin and CROWN, we update either the lower or the upper bound in one
iteration since the certified bound is either 0 or the current choice of . However, it is possible
for PEC to update both the lower and the upper bound in one iteration, which leads to a faster
convergence of .
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Let x′ = x+ ∆ be a point that breaks condition (3). Then,
Ui(x+ ∆) + pi < 0
⇐⇒ Ui∆ < −Uix− pi
=⇒ − ‖Ui‖q‖∆‖p < −Uix− pi
⇐⇒ ‖∆‖p > Uix+ pi‖Ui‖q
(13)
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Algorithm 2: Search for optimal value of 
Input: x, , ¯, ∆, f ,M
Set the bounds of : up = ¯, low = 
while up − low > ∆ do
try = 12(low + up)
cert = f(M,x, try)
Update lower bound: low = max{low, cert}
if try > cert then
Update upper bound: ¯ = try
end if
end while
Output: 12(low + up)
The =⇒ comes from Hölder’s inequality. (13) indicates that a perturbation of lp norm over
dic = max
{
0, Uix+pi‖Ui‖q
}
is needed to break the sufficient condition of z′(N)c − z′(N)i ≥ 0. Based
on the assumption of adversarial budget S(p) (x) when linearizing the model, the lp norm of a
perturbation to produce an adversarial example is at least min {, dc}.
C.2 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. We use the primal-dual method to solve the optimization problem (4), which is a convex
optimization problem with linear constraints.
It is clear that there exists an image inside the allowable pixel space for which the model
predicts the wrong label. That is, the constrained problem (4) is strictly feasible:
∃∆ s.t. a∆ + b < 0,∆(min) < ∆ < ∆(max) . (14)
Thus, this convex optimization problem satisfies Slater’s Condition, i.e., strong duality holds.
We then rewrite the primal problem as
min
∆(min)≤∆≤∆(max)
‖∆‖pp
s.t. a∆ + b ≤ 0
(15)
We minimize ‖∆‖pp instead of directly ‖∆‖p in order to decouple all elements in vector ∆.
In addition, we consider ∆(min) ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆(max) as the domain of ∆ instead of constraints for
simplicity. We write the dual problem of (15) by introducing a coefficient of relaxation λ ∈ R+:
max
λ≥0
min
∆(min)≤∆≤∆(max)
g(∆, λ)
def
== ‖∆‖pp + λ(a∆ + b) (16)
To solve the inner minimization problem, we set the gradient ∂g(∆,λ)∂∆i = sign(∆i)p|∆i|p−1 +λai
to zero and obtain ∆i = −sign(ai)
∣∣∣λaip ∣∣∣ 1p−1 . Based on the convexity of function g(∆, λ) w.r.t. ∆,
we can obtain the optimal ∆˜i in the domain:
∆˜i = clip
(
−sign(ai)
∣∣∣∣λaip
∣∣∣∣ 1p−1 ,min = ∆(min)i ,max = ∆(max)i
)
. (17)
Based on strong duality, we can say that the optimal ∆˜ is chosen by setting a proper value
of λ. Fortunately, ‖∆˜‖p increases monotonically with λ, so the smallest λ corresponds to the
optimum.
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As we can see, the expression of ∆̂ in (5) is consistent with ∆˜i in (17) if λ is set properly.3
The greedy algorithm in Algorithm 1 describes the process of gradually increasing λ to find the
smallest value satisfying the constraint a∆ + b ≤ 0. With the increase of λ, the elements in
vector ∆ remain unchanged when they reach either ∆(min) or ∆(max), so we keep such elements
fixed and optimize the others.
D Additional Experiments
D.1 Details of the Experiments
D.1.1 Model Architecture
The FC1 and CNN networks used in this paper are identical to the ones used in [5]. The FC1
network is a fully-connected network with one hidden layer of 1024 neurons. The CNN network
has two convolutional layers and one additional hidden layer before the output layer. Both
convolutional layers have a kernel size of 4, a stride of 2 and a padding of 1 on both sides, so
the height and width of the feature maps are halved after each convolutional layer. The first
convolutional layer has 32 channels while the second one has 16. The hidden layer following the
convolutional layers has 100 neurons.
D.1.2 Hyper-parameter Settings
In all experiments, we use the Adam optimizer [14] with an initial learning rate of 10−3 and train
all models for 100 epochs with a mini-batch of 100 instances. For CNN models, we decrease the
learning rate to 10−4 for the last 10 epochs. When we train CNN models on MNIST, we only
calculate the polyhedral envelope of 20 instances subsampled from each mini-batch. When we
train CNN models on CIFAR10, this subsampling number is 10. For PER and PER+at, the
value of T is always 4. We search in the logarithmic scale for the value of γ and in the linear
scale for the value of α. For , we ensure that its final values are close to the ones used in the
adversarial budget S(p) (x). We compare constant values with an exponential growth scheme for
 but always use constant values for α and γ. The optimal values we found for different settings
are provided in Table 4.
α  γ
MNIST - FC1, l∞ constant, 0.15
initial value 0.0064 constant, 0.1×2 every 20 epochs
MNIST - CNN, l∞ constant, 0.15 constant, 0.1
constant, 0.3 for PER
constant, 0.03 for PER+at
CIFAR10 - CNN, l∞ constant, 0.1 constant, 0.008
constant, 3× 10−4 for PER
constant, 1× 10−3 for PER+at
MNIST - FC1, l2 constant, 0.45
initial value 0.02 constant, 1.0×2 every 20 epochs
MNIST - CNN, l2 constant, 0.45 constant, 0.3 constant, 1.0
CIFAR10 - CNN, l2 constant, 0.15 constant, 0.1
constant, 0.3 for PER
constant, 1.0 for PER+at
Table 4: Values of α,  and γ for different experiments.
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Figure 8: Parameter value distributions of
CIFAR10 models trained against l2 attack.
The Euclidean norms of KW, MMR+at,
PER+at model against l2 attacks are 71.34,
62.97 and 141.77, respectively.
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Figure 10: Distribution of certified bounds by one-shot PEC for different models on CIFAR10
in l∞ (Left) and l2 (Right) cases. The y-axis shows the number of points in the test set whose
certified bounds are smaller than the corresponding value of the x-axis. Lower values on the
y-axis mean more robust models.
D.2 Additional Experimental Results
D.2.1 Additional Figures
The parameter value distributions of CIFAR10 models against l2 attacks are provided in Figure 8.
The distribution of optimal certified bounds of CIFAR10 models against l2 attacks is shown in
Figure 9.
D.2.2 Distribution of One-Shot Certified Bounds
The distribution of certified bounds obtained by one-shot PEC on the CIFAR10 models of Table 1
is shown in Figure 10. We plot the number of points whose certified bounds are smaller than a
given value, so the jump at x = 0 depicts the number of points totally uncertified, while the jump
at x =  depicts the number of fully certified points. The slope between both ends represents the
points partially certified, which accounts for 10%− 20% of all the points. They are the points
not certified by KW / Fast-Lin but that have non-trivial bounds by PEC. Among all training
methods, our proposed PER+at has competitive performance with KW in the l∞ case and the
best performance in the l2 case.
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D.2.3 Searching for the Optimal Value of 
Table 5 shows the number of bound calculations in the binary search for the optimal  in PEC
and Fast-Lin. In l∞ cases, the original interval [, ¯] is [0, 0.4] for MNIST and [0, 0.1] for CIFAR10.
In l2 cases, the original interval [, ¯] is [0, 1.2] for MNIST and [0, 0.4] for CIFAR10. The bound
of the number calculation does not depend on the model in Fast-Lin and is model-dependent in
PEC as discussed in Section 4.3.
TLin TPEC
TPEC
TLin
TLin TPEC
TPEC
TLin
TLin TPEC
TPEC
TLin
MNIST-FC1, ReLU, l∞ MNIST-CNN, ReLU, l∞ CIFAR10-CNN, ReLU, l∞
plain
12
9.85 0.8207
12
10.56 0.8804
10
9.33 0.9331
at 10.77 0.8972 11.39 0.9489 9.12 0.9128
KW 8.48 0.7066 11.61 0.9674 8.43 0.8432
MMR 8.04 0.6703 10.68 0.8897 8.05 0.8053
MMR+at 7.68 0.6402 11.22 0.9351 8.45 0.8450
C-PER 9.34 0.7780 11.17 0.9305 8.61 0.8606
C-
PER+at
9.38 0.7816 11.74 0.9784 8.68 0.8681
MNIST-FC1, ReLU, l2 MNIST-CNN, ReLU, l2 CIFAR10-CNN, ReLU, l2
plain
14
9.68 0.6914
14
13.64 0.9742
12
11.73 0.9775
at 10.44 0.7457 13.76 0.9829 11.67 0.9725
KW 7.72 0.5514 12.63 0.9021 10.23 0.8525
MMR 5.86 0.4186 8.52 0.6086 9.05 0.7542
MMR+at 5.91 0.4221 12.13 0.8664 10.33 0.8608
C-PER 11.47 0.8194 13.75 0.9819 9.13 0.7609
C-
PER+at
11.34 0.8100 13.72 0.9796 10.71 0.8926
Table 5: Number of steps of bound calculation for the optimal  in Fast-Lin (TLin) and PEC
(TPEC) for ReLU networks. Note that TLin is a constant for different models given the original
interval [, ¯].
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